ApolloPanel_Full.mp4

double-a and we simply couldn’t do without them john is a longtime personal friend vice president for Space Exploration business development but for those of you who who look down your nose and business development you got to have in a program manager before that Atlas 5 has John carassius thumb prints all over it so John thank you for your support and please come to pull you morning everybody there you go hey Bob I really run a line of business I kind of graduated from BD to real program management so I just didn’t want to scare you there but thank you very much on behalf of my boss to and McGwire who is the leader of space systems company for Lockheed Martin and I’ll say the 17,000 space systems company employees Lockheed Martin is very honored and pleased to host this year’s conference and of course as being the 45th propulsion conference in the joint conference with energy I think that is just fantastic so we are honored and pleased to be the sponsor this morning one of the executive sponsors for the whole conference I just want to let you know that by combining these two conferences I think you really have a totally unabridged a set of sessions that really cover from one another spectrum terrestrial energy all the way to what it takes to do interstellar missions and things that goes as complicated and then as small as individual components to total mission integration so I think this is a wonderful conference and I hope everybody’s looking forward to those things what I think is also really important is the capstone of the conference on Wednesday ostp the Office of Science and Technology Policy will be here soliciting your inputs so I know it’s at the end of the conference but if you be here for that that would be excellent but most importantly today for this morning this being the summer of 09 which is the 40th anniversary of the first Apollo moon landing we thought it was very appropriate and that we have a wonderful an August panel with us today to talk about the history of Apollo so with no further ado I’ll turn it back over to the general dyckman and again thank you all for coming John thank you please pass on our thanks to Joanne and into Lockheed Martin yeah unless you’ve been asleep for the last couple months you are aware that that we have just celebrated the 40th anniversary of apollo 11 TV shows celebrations all around the country we are perhaps the last in the sequence of those I’m not sure how many more are still going to come my personal thanks doc 20 Gupta the technical director for both propulsion and energy what a coincidence that you’re together for encouraging us to have this panel i wanti and what you stayed up and say hi to folks are 20 is one of my bosses I’ve got a I double-a has a board of about 35 members and the role engineers think about it the focus this morning is going to be on the Apollo era not on Apollo 11 not on the 40th anniversary essentially that period from from President Kennedy’s speech on the twenty-fifth of May nineteen sixty one through apollo-soyuz into that period where we were waiting for the shuttle to come on certainly Apollo 11 is an event in history that that I think all of us will remember or study if you weren’t alive at that time perhaps the the hallmark will be looked back on as the hallmark event of either that century or my guess is maybe that millennia human beings going to do off earth but that one small step that Neil took was just one step on an amazingly long and amazingly complex journey that this country took our panelists this morning were involved in every step of that process from the formation of NASA to the end of the Saturn Apollo era and the transition into the shuttle they were key players and development operations on the booster on the modules and in the exploration itself the format for the panel is I’m going to go through a brief introduction of each of them then ask them to speak in the order that they’re sitting there’s some logic to that and I’ll explain that as we go along detail biographies of all of them are on the net these are these are all people that that are easily googleable if you will but each panelist will spend a couple minutes describing what they did in that era and how it fit into the bigger process of what’s been going on as after I get done with the introductions and we start that process will also have questions between members of the panels and I will interject with some questions

to try to bring out things that I think are important to this audience and audience it’s incredibly skilled in propulsion and energy and the overall space and aerospace programs depending on the timing lieutenant governor Barbour O’Brien is going to be here to share her welcoming remarks and so we have a window that we have to leave for her and then you will have to do your technical session starting at ten o’clock so depending on how much time we have we’ll open the floor to questions we’ll have someone come around with cards but we’ll just see how that plays out over time I said the panelists will speak in the order that you see that’s unless they decide to do differently I have worked with some of these guys in the past and they are free willed and will probably ignore almost everything that I ask that they do but we’ll see how that all goes they made the decisions that put 11 of their colleagues on the moon 42 of their colleagues in the space before that long gap between the end of apollo-soyuz in shuttle yes yes I know that there were 12 one of the people here actually was on the moon and so 12-1 is 1111 colleagues so I think the math was right well start name with flight directors work our way through roles at what’s now JSC million Space Flight Center at the time Marshall Kennedy and then the next last speaker will be dr. Schmidt a guy that sat on the pointy end of the rocket but as with many of the astronauts but perhaps more than the most spend an awful lot of time involved and what was going on behind the scenes to make it all work our first speaker will be Jerry Griffin Jerry went on to become director at Johnson Space Center he’s a Texas Aggie with a degree in aeronautical engineering we 101 aircraft in the Air Force was part of the air forces of the nation’s actually earliest unmanned space programs at Sunnyvale some of you may be familiar with what those might have been was in mission control during Gemini GNC guidance navigation control services flight director on every band Apollo mission and was the lead flight director on Apollo 12 15 and 17 the flight director oversaw a team in the control room that was supported by literally thousands of people across the country but in the heat of a mission flight that’s them talk to a very small group of incredible experts the next person on our cue Frank France and Lyra was part of that group he was booster if you ever listen to any tapes on the communications net employee actually a marshal he was on the Conn sold in what’s called the mocha the mission operation control room responsible for for the Saturn as booster but his primary expertise was actually in the saturn for be the third stage he has the creation engineering from rpi Frank I went to Union if I had known RPI when I invited you i might not have their rival schools a little waste park management from MIT currently vice president and senior account manager for NASA programs at one of our corporate members Harris Corporation Frank wasn’t alone in having to deal with with issues and neither were the 17 other people on the flight directors immediate teamed as 17 other people that sat in the MOC are each Merritt major area had a staff support room physically located just a few steps away from the MOC are and in an adjacent building there was NASA and contractor teams and mission evaluation room and all that sort of was orchestrated by a thing called the spacecraft analysis support room was staffed with senior managers who are not only experts in their own right that is they grown up in the specific disciplines that they were involved in what they manage the flow of information into and out of the motor as they were is very detailed questions Arnie Aldridge our next speaker joined NASA 1959 with the space test group at Langley that became the flight control group at the manned spacecraft Center with what’s now JSC the fellow of AI double a graduate of Northeastern University he supported mercury and Gemini with positions in the control network and the control rooms was on the GNC console for in the moc our rapallo he was the chief of the command service module assistance branch in the CSM service rep in the span so far we’ve looked at the functions that manage the flights that is in the control rooms themselves of course somebody needed to light the fire under those rockets before there was anything for those flight controllers to do nominally Houston took over at a tower clear Bob seek is a graduate of UVA the test conductor at Kennedy during that Apollo era actually during the shuttle era he went on to be the equivalent of a flight director Jerry in England was the flight director for the return to flight after the Challenger accident and what for more than 50 launches Bob flight conductor I did a little bit of launch

in my past I never knew how long you could hold your breath and who you got to t0 Bob you must have one hell of a set of lungs Jr Thompson is the president and CEO of Orbital Sciences another AI double a corporate member and may I EE fellow actually orbitals the home of our current president today are served in NASA as the deputy administrator at headquarters but for 20 years was it Marshall at Marshall Space Flight Center was the director of Marshall when he left has been the managers of the ssme the space shuttle shuttle main engine program and a whole variety of programs programs in positions leading up to that he joined Marshall in 1963 as a liquid propulsion manager and during the Saturn program was most closely involved with the j2 engine that’s seen a rebirth and constellation with the j-2x five of those locks hydrogen date j2s powered the saturn s2 second stage and one was the saturn 4b third stage not only allowed that system to reach orbit but then had to be restarted to do the translunar injection jrs ramblin wreck from Georgia Tech degree in arrow and has engineering masters from the University of Florida Jack Schmitt is the last man to have climbed down the ladder to stand on the moon it’s a very carefully chosen term and he was the next to last to leave followed by as Apollo 17 commander Gene Cernan jack was in the first group of scientist astronauts selected in 1965 and had been named a fly on Apollo 18 but then when the program was curtailed at 17 flights it was it was speculated and in fact happened to move that that scientist the PhD in geology forward into the last flight so we did have a no kidding trained geologist that walked with the surface of the Moon as you might expect he did as much training of his fellow astronauts on what rocks the pick up as as training he did himself well that may not be quite true but but certainly he did an awful lot of that he was on the Apollo 15 backup crew spent more than three days on the moon 22 hours of EV a they drove more than 20 miles in their Rover broke the fender sir none did Cernan broke the fender Yeah right back over 250 pounds of rocks including what’s characterized as the most interesting sample from the whole program a truck delight seven six five three five there’ll be a quiz afterwards on why that’s an interesting piece of rock dr. Schmidt’s undergraduate degree is from Caltech he studied the University of Oslo and doing research that led to his PhD which was a PhD from in geology from Harvard he was elected the Senate following his retirement from NASA and I’d be willing to bet that walking on the moon was more fun than walking the halls of the Congress our final speaker will be Glynn Lunney when lenny joined NACA and yes I did say naca and not na sa at the then Lewis research center adjured after graduating from the University of Detroit in summer of nineteen fifty-eight just before NASA stood up the heat transferred to that space same space test group at twenty-one years old he was the youngest of the 45 members of that group in 1958 during mercury he was a flight dynamics officer at the cape and it remote sites the Mission Control was done from the Cape from mercury in the first couple I guess Gemini flights before it moved to Texas in 1964 he and gene Krantz were selected by Chris Kraft to join craft and John Hodge as flight directors he was a late flight director for Apollo 7 that first bee in flight after the after the fire and after some other challenging things in unmanned test flights many of us I’m sure I’ve seen the Apollo 13 movie and walk away with the impression that there was only one flight director hardly true both of our flight directors here were very very heavily involved in that TK Mattingly a longtime friend of AI double a has described Glenn lenny’s effort says the most magnificent this magnificent display of personal leadership that I have ever seen during that program he was the technical director and then the overall project manager for the apollo-soyuz test program went on to become a shuttle program manager continue to support the shuttle from rockwell and United Space Alliance after tired from NASA in 1985 he’s also a fellow of AI double a so that’s the crew that’s the kind of things they’ve done so Jerry let’s start with you and where were you what you do and how did it fit Bob asked us to talk a little bit about how we got to where we were in the Apollo program I got there a little bit differently than than some of the other guys here I when I graduated from college I got commissioned in the Air Force so I had a commitment and I spent four years in the Air Force and then I got out and went to work right i was at hamilton Air Force Base if any of you know where that is it’s closed now went

right down the peninsula and went to work for lockheed missiles and space at sunnyvale and for those of you that might remember we were doing some very interesting programs early stuff discoverer and midas and the same modes and blames like that and we flew on the Agena as the upper stage in several of those so I had been trying to get in to NASA and just couldn’t get him work it out but I finally made it and I actually was pulled into to work on the Agena because the Gemini it was to dock with it and I need something about the spacecraft I had been a systems guy and so I actually went to JSC in 1964 and was going to be an aegina gap and I was only there about 30 days and I got shifted over to actually work for Arnie Aldridge and be a GNC guidance navigation and control systems officer and this was the hardware monitoring and of all the propulsion on board to CSM and it was a it was a great training ground when the fire happened we had a break in the program I was getting ready on to be a GNC for Apollo and and in that break period chris-craft are our big boss decided he needed some more flight director so named three more flight directors and I got chosen as as one of those so I then worked Apollo 7 which was the next flight with mr. Lonnie in the lead and I was the real rookie on that crew great start and from there I went through the rest of the program working with all these guys down the line here in one phase or another all as a flight director and it was an extremely fun and particularly to all you young folks in the audience I hope you get a chance to do it again because it was it was the culmination of a great national effort and we were very fortunate to be in it Frank you were you were on console in that stuff I tried to briefly describe the moc are and all those folks would tell us more about you and where you were and what your relationship was to this this kind of guy well this kind of guy over here was a great guy to be working with let me start back just a little bit further though Bob that I started out of school I knew right away in school that I want to be part of the NASA team so I joined Marshall Space Flight Center in 1962 dr. von Braun was running marshal at the time along with a lot of the his German compatriots that came over after the v2 days and my first boss was a German matter of fact and we had a great team working it and and of course is particularly appropriate because part of the conference series propulsion and so that’s my background I was primarily working on the s4 be staged a third stage design of the propulsion systems and junior was working on the on the engine part of it and do the first real serious experience i had i guess was the third flight of the third stage there was going to be the first manned flight which would have been a apollo 8 at the time I was out of Sacramento we were doing a full up test on that stage and it blew up and it was the same week as Apollo fire and so that was a that was a long hard week for all of us but it really sunk in and how serious this business really is and obviously we all took it seriously but that was kind of that was a very traumatic experience for all of us and 1967 we picked a team to go down to Johnson to be flight controllers to be responsible for the saturn pipe for the Apollo missions and as was mentioned before control went from from KSC to Johnson Space Center at tower clear which is about 10 seconds into the mission and at that point the booster crowd which was I was the booster one we had a team on the console we also had a team in the back room and I think our Neil talk a little bit more about that but at that point we took over control so anything happening in real time was you know from the Saturn five was a booster of responsibility my first mission was the second test flight which was unmanned and I’m sure you probably heard about this or hear more about it from some of the other panel members but we we had two engines out on the second

stage and wasn’t clear whether this thing was ever going to get into orbit or not there were three people in the play and the Mission Control Center the mocha that had abort command switches was a flight director it was the flight dynamics officer and it was a booster and on the unmanned flights if you threw that switch it wasn’t abort and so obviously serious times there the mission rule on 50 to one man was if you had two adjacent control engines out on the second stage which there were five has mentioned for outboard and one in the center it wasn’t supposed to be able to control so there was a mission ruled so we’re supposed to work but the watching their console and I was actually the back up on that but the booster one watched it it did control we had another problem with the Range Safety Officer it looked like you know it’s that ghosts that call different gates but I had an African gate and if the thing shut off and you know the African gate we were in the African Gaeta means it would land in Africa which obviously was a bad day so again the Range Safety Officer was supposed to send a command as well and we’re talking about of doing that because it was controlling and it did live into orbit and the third stage failed to restart and so at that point the flight dynamics officer simply bored switch and there was an alternate sequence and the command module did its thing and I think you guys should Glen maybe you or jerrika comea but I think that’s the only time that the abort switch has ever been sent right in the control I believe I was just saying that when I think that’s the only time the aborts whichever has actually been sent in from the mocha Mission Control Center so anyway that was that experience and then of course we had the Apollo 8 following that which is a very gutsy mission after all the problems we had on the second unmanned flight and from that point on from a booster standpoint things went pretty well we did have a you know a kind of a tough row on Apollo 12 we got hit by lightning right off the launch pad and a booster did great and command module got reconfigured in orbit and went on to the moon so it was great experience being a booster I was very we were all young at the time my first mission I was 28 and you know we had a we did a lot of simulations a lot of training and we did a lot of coordination with guys at the cape and I’m sure you’ll hear more from Bob seek on that but obviously a very close coordination there we had reached back to Marshall Space Flight Center who I actually worked for two time although in real time I reported the flight director and we also had on call 24 hours a day just about any kind of support that we really needed during a mission the Bender’s Marshall Space Flight Center all the experts there as well as the people in the back room so working for guys like Jerry Griffin and Glynn Lunney was a just a terrific experience so it’s a good team that’s that’s my background so frankly you were a 4b guy and yet you the interface with flight for the whole booster did you have to go through any kind of certification process or the deeds guys quiz you beforehand to make sure that that you had your stuff together well when i was there actually wasn’t a certification so much it was just trial by fire we did an awful lot of simulations and the sim soup guys we put together all the scripts and they tried their hardest to trip us up so by the time it got to the mission you know it was kind of pretty easy compared to the kind of stuff we had to go through during the simulation but at that time Bob to answer your question no it wasn’t any particular certification we not only did the simulation but he had other training from a system standpoint so we actually had the flight control you end up being a really good systems engineer so you got involved from structures avionics electrical you know the whole nine yards now Arnie Frank mentioned the back rooms and the interface to the rest of the world you were on console during Gemini but but during Apollo you had a very different role you kind of ran that process for the community service module I think a little bit about that well I’d like to comment on that Bob because one of the aspects of it is most people here at the table that are talking today are all from the flat operation mission operation mission execution standpoint and as you all know there were literally hundreds of thousands of design and development people that built this equipment also and this room that has been referred to it was called the spacecraft analysis room with a nickname span and the purpose of that was to enable a structure that would allow this Mission Control team that was fully

trained and capable and intent on executing the mission and whatever happened but give them the capability to also draw the design and development community in real time I’m in an organized and structured way and I’ll get back to that in a minute but I’d first like to talk a little bit about my early career before we got to something as elaborate as that I’m really glad Bob that she talked about the this being the Mercury Gemini Apollo time frame because to me at least that was a continuum it started and just flowed through all three of those one to the other and they were tremendously connected and what we did and how we did it and what our objectives were i started with NASA six months after they awarded the mercury contract McDonald aircraft and three months after the first seven astronauts were chosen my first role was not to start flying missions but participate in creating the mercury tracking network that was going to support it there are a number of sites that supported the mercury flights but 13 of the more manned flights around the world and we actually sent flight controllers to each them because in those days there were no satellite communications there was no data relay if you wanted to communicate with a vehicle a look at its telemetry you had to have a flight controller at the station to do it and some of the stations had voice communication back to the Mission Control Center but about half of them the only communication back was teletype and that might give all of you a frame of reference in today’s technology world how it was with no satellites for communication no computers no email no blackberries none of that it was pretty manual stuff a mercury pass would be anywhere from one to five minutes over a site and if you wanted to communicate to the control center you’d write out a teletype message hand it to a teletype operator he’d sent it to Cape Canaveral the Cape Canaveral it would respond would write an answer you bet his teletype operator would come back and if you’re lucky you could do that in five minutes but it wasn’t easy most of the stuff was before the fact and after anyway my first job in mercury was to work on the flight control facilities and the flight control procedures for these remote sites and we had we had a capsule communicator and an aramid and a mercury systems flight controller at each of the sites they each had a console and so I said I worked on setting that up a whole bunch of people from the tracking network side of NASA in when the mission started I was a Capcom at grammas for the first two flights of the mercury analysts and then the second to which were manned orbital flight zenus and then John Glenn I was the Capcom at pornog well which is now part of annenberg if floor space both of those sites were the retrofire sites and we were there to back it up or are supported if with a ground command if necessary for the last three flights in mercury I was the mission the mercury systems officer in the Mission Control Center which in those days Cape Canaveral and those were all one shift missions so we didn’t have multiple shifts as was mentioned for geminii after the first manned orbital flight which are still out of the Cape we moved to the new Control Center in Houston and we moved into the future which had three shifts for every console as we went forward and for Gemini I got to be in charge of all of the flight controllers that were there for the gemenese spacecraft we had two positions in the Mission Control Room of supporting these flight directors and we had four positions in what we call 2 staff support room in the back room and so I had an organization about 25 people half of which were civil service and has from half of which were from McDonald aircraft and from the philco tech rep organization and we manned the system’s consoles now we had ten remote sites for geminii because some more data automation had come in and we we we manned the ten remote sites from and the 4 consoles in the support staff room and the 2 and the milker and so we had a pretty big operation I had about 25 people and we were responsible for all

of our preparation leading up to it the Germany mission rules the Germany we build systems handbook for each flight where we drew schematics of every every system and a spacecraft that focused on where the telemetry signals were where the commands could go how this crew switch is interacted so you could in real time advise and operate the control of the spacecraft I operated that GNC console as Jerry pointed out for each of the missions during the gemenese sequence but then when we get to Apollo we had an even bigger operation each of these each of these programs from Mercury Gemini Apollo of each one was orders of magnitude more complicated than the previous one and we got to Apollo and I now had 50 flight controllers to train and to prepare for and support now three different consoles in the mission control room and we had now six consoles in the back room and we had still early in the program we still had some remote sites but by the time we were at the lunar flights we were now fully automated and had a much much more capable network than when we began the subject we started with the spacecraft analysis was another staff support room that’s just off the mission control room and my job was to be the CSM management in that room I was joined by management from the Apollo program office and management for the north american aviation corporation who those people interfaced with a with a building that’s right next to the control center that had a whole floor dedicated to what we call the mission evaluation room and in that room there were consoles and displays and communications and some 50 to 100 engineers from NASA engineering and North American engineering were brought in there for the mission to also monitor the flight but they didn’t interact directly with the control team who had a full job and knew the timing and had to pay attention to what was going on in flight they communicated through this span and therefore from the CSM through me to my flight control team on the console and questions could go either way they were documented and structured but even though they couldn’t serve you too well in a very time-critical situation they served very well when it came was a little time to analyze things and add to our knowledge for something we hadn’t seen before so we brought those engineering people directly into Mission Support to participate and at the plant and there’s a similar organization for this with Grumman for the limb by the way but at North American there was a control room out there also which didn’t have data displays but had the communication loops they supported the mission evaluation room with the engineers that had come to Houston Mission Support room scored the span who then interface directly with these CSM people now if you project that across the whole mission control room there were other SSRS some of them went through the span and some of them didn’t we had we had MIT there for the software and the computer that controlled the Apollo CSM and LEM and so forth but there was booster Harrow med flight dynamics is a big flight dynamics support job that maybe Glenn could say something about payload recovery so when you look at the mission on TV and you see the flight director and the capsule communicator and you see the video of the astronaut there’s a few more people involved and really that was my job after the Apollo 15 chris-craft asked me to come to the building one at Johnson Space Center and become the deputy program manager for Skylab program so that kind of finished my mission operations work but started a long career in program management okay let me let me go back to a specific incident in Apollo that they well have ended up in spam but it didn’t have time to and that was a lightning strike on Apollo 12 you mentioned it Frank Jerry you were the lead flight Dre you were the flight director at during the launch and Arnie I’m sure that when when the consoles went blank a lot of other things started to go pretty blank in your mind and hurry well there’s another man you ought to have here to talk because he’s one of the geniuses of this business with Tom now that’s man named Jon Arryn he was on the ecomm console when that happened and everyone in the control room was totally befuddled John recognized what had probably fight this is a lightning strike coming through the command module taking the fuel cells and one AC inverter offline and scrambling all of the instrumentation so it was nonsense on all the consoles and John

instantly came up with a call fitted the flight directors for something they never heard before the call was SCE to hawks and everybody looked down Mike is this guy been flipped by the lightning to do but they did it and it was stood the instrumentation the Saturn wasn’t affected and put it into orbit and with the instrumentation back the CSM was recovered and in a river river and a half we were able to do enough check out that we were able to commit to translunar injection and go to the moon Jerry the transcripts of that don’t go quite so smoothly it’s flight to air and say what do you see nothing check the mic here please now there’s a funny piece to that and I share it with you right quick Arnie hit on it what happened is about 50 seconds after liftoff and I was this was my first launched as a flight director in it so I was rookie in terms of launching and I thought my gosh you know we may have to abort we got hit by lightning figured out later about 50 seconds after we lift it off as Arnie said it didn’t affect the good old saturn I you which was it was taking us up hill we were right on the right trajectory so I figured well if we’re going to abort we might as well don’t get in a hurry get some altitude so they had plenty of time for the shoot to work and so forth but the Saturn kept us on track the funny thing that happened with them and when I went back and listened to the voice tapes and I remember it in real time Jon Arryn is he said that flight having go SCE to aux and we had never talked about that switch it was an obscure one in front of the lunar module pilot out of a several hundred switches and I said what and he said SCE to aux meaning signal conditioning equipment to auxiliary is what it stood for well I turned to the Capcom in us who is Jerry car and I said Capcom having go SCE to aux and Jerry said what and I said SCE to aux so like a good Capcom he called Conrad said follow 12 SCE to aux be Conrad said what and finally Jon Arryn said signal conditioning of equipment to auxiliary and so Jerry repeated that to him and at that point out being said I know where that switch is and he went and he threw it and when he did we got all of our data back on the ground and that’s where we where John could tell that the fuel cells had been knocked off and we got him reset nothing went there but that is what was a chain of events with the wording that was really funny when afterwards it wasn’t so funny at the time but anyway that’s that kind of tough that went up but I’d had a footnote to that the command service module control room at the Cape course we have systems consoles and they have displays with them with with a number of lights and we did a lot of simulated launches and aborts from that control room and as Jerry said at the some 50 seconds after liftoff we’d already had tower clear but that doesn’t mean we all go outside and call it a day you know we’re tied into the mission anyway the lights that came on with that lightning strike looked exactly like one of the aborts that we had practice and we were convinced that they had aborted until we turned in the communication channels and actually heard Pete Conrad laughing about say I think we got hit by lightning and you know I’d like that I’d like to add something to that to pick up my friend Jerry down at the end it was his first flight as a flight director and I was sitting beside him in kind of a riding shotgun way and as we talked to going the throwing the switch got the communications the telemetry back and we got into orbit orbit and had to realign the platform because it had been doing a lot of tumbling in the in the command service module the saturn and the iu was fine so we got in orbit and we usually spent two and a half ribs in orbit checking everything out so we spent a lot of time checking everything we could possibly find on the command service module or anything else to find out if there was a problem that would prevent us from going to the moon and we kind of operate it on the principle that we’re going to keep going until we find some

solid reason not to we’d have to justify aborting it well we went through everything and probably one of the things that crossed our mind was its ill-advised to launch a lightning storm so don’t do it again but that was for a later lesson we spent the 23 hours 3-4 hours in lunar loot and Earth orbit trying to figure out that we were okay and at the end of that we condensed the following discussion that the discussion would have gone like look we had something happen but the vehicle flies okay Saturn the IU instrument unit is fine it’s likely to be fine again because everything looks behind the command service module is back align with the platform everything’s looking fine we have no basis for stopping this thing so at the end of that discussion that we didn’t have but which we intuited as we went along Jerry and I looked at each other we did this well why not and so we said Jerry did that it was a go and we went on to flight admission to the moon it was completely successful congratulations Jerry good call the other thing that was the only other thing that happened on that flight it was very very clean flight the only other thing that happened was we lost the TV on the surface of the moon so we missed part of the of the excursion but uh nat wait how the TV was lost yeah oh yeah well my good friend Albion Haven those of you that may understand this i’m a graduate of texas A&M and i went to the University of Texas and I’ve never let him forget it he actually turned the camera to the Sun and that was before we had later we had some filters and automatic shutdown that but he burned out the TV because he pointed it at the Sun I’ve never let him forget it and I’ll take us back to the cave well ok and a few words about the Cape of course that’s where the launches and occur but before you launch you first have to assemble the vehicle and payload or the spacecraft and all hardware arrives at the Cape with some assembly required some more so than others so and so we we put everything together and we test it and inspect it and then launch it and the requirements for that too sure that the systems are operating as the designers intended them to the requirements for that for the most part come from the development centers Johnson & Marsal and it’s our job to put all those requirements into coherent procedures and and verify that the heart where performs per the specifications if they let me honest and and then it’s okay to to give the go to launch my and that’s that’s work that I did for for many years down there like most of these guys I after completing my military obligation and the Air Force in my case supporting missile operations around the country I ended up with NASA at the beginning of the Gemini program and I was assigned the system for the biomedical instrumentation back in the early 60s we still didn’t have enough information at least the doctors didn’t think so about the effects of space on the astronauts so they were pretty much covered from head to toe with medical sensors electrocardiogram respiration rate blood pressure and and and even the electroencephalogram in some cases for the brain anyway that so our team was a flight surgeon the technicians a suit techs and the bio med techs and the engineers and and we instrumented the astronauts and tested all that equipment it was all hands on work for us we didn’t have a contractor counterpart and and once they were all suited up and we verified that work good of course the astronauts went up in the capsule and we went in the blockhouse and once they got connected on board we we verified that they had good data and went on with the mission so that’s that’s the way I started and always felt privileged is a young engineer at the ripe old age of 25 to be a member of the launch team for the first land Gemini mission as Arne indicated Apollo was an order of magnitude degree of difficulty the hardware was more complex there was more of it the Saturn five had three stages of course there were two payloads two spacecraft we flew on every mission so there’s five sets of hardware for each mission you know we always had three missions and flow when Apollo 11 was on the launch pad the Apollo 12 hardware was getting assembled and tested in VA

be an Apollo 13 hardware particularly the spacecraft was going through processing at the ONC building so so we had a city a factory going at KSC 25,000 employees we worked round the clock seven days a week and in and I ended up with the most of the third shift work on the command service module because of the complexity and the number of systems involved yeah we we established the position as it were of the equivalent of a technical test conductor there was the operations test conductor the launch operations manager launch director but for the technical bringing together the systems that had to play together we had our equivalent of the mission evaluation room and the span engineers who assessed that how that the integrated testing was going and if there were changes to the procedures or troubleshooting to be performed the test integration engineer took control of that activity and and we often had to rely on the expertise from either Houston our marshal to sort out problems and they occurred often when the procedures didn’t play so as we had written them or the hardware didn’t act the way the technical requirements from the design centers indicated that it should so it was it was challenging work it was hard work and and what we found that was refreshing to us was the support we got around the clock seven days a week even when there wasn’t a mission in place in the motor and the control center was fully staffed we could call the mission evaluation room four o’clock on a Sunday morning when you think the rest of the world is sleeping and then they are and within minutes we would be tied into a teleconference with the subsystem manager for that particular system the designer the contractor counterpart and even the original equipment manufacturer who built the part that was we had the question about and so we enjoyed unlimited resources in in the business of putting people on the moon and I’m sure we wouldn’t have accomplished what we did in a big picture if there had not been that commitment and the resources available to pull it off we we worked a lot a lot of issues we learned a lot in the first couple of missions by the time we got up to Apollo 11 I wouldn’t say that the third shift work was boring but there was not as much of it as much activity as there were on original missions but as you know we were still learning things as Apollo 13 proved when when our procedures were part of the root cause of that particular accident so you could never take your eye off the ball so to speak with the with the word we did I again as I look back at it I worked with or for most of the people on this panel and it was always a privilege to be part of that great adventure Bob how much of that relationship was was personal not just a voice at the end of a telephone but really building a level of trust it I morally you can have a center that’s the manager for an element and Johnson’s going to take care of it after its clears the tower and you guys got to do a check ahead sign that level of trust among the engineers and all had to be pretty high well that it it was and and there were people you talk to you it was the same name and that for that particular system in that particular discipline so you you all felt that you were members of the same team and and you knew the work was important but you say well if this person said they worked it in and you can trust what they say but but you couldn’t just write it off there just because you saw their signature stamp of approval on it meant that it was okay to go he still had to go through your own process of verifying that everything was was within spec and it was okay to to proceed so it trust was part of it but I think what made it successful was the communication in the availability of resources you could always find the expert that can pass on needed information so you could disposition the issue let me ask a different question in its from the time the president’s that

go till to launch not a long time and yet the infrastructure was built up at the Cape was almost unbelievable just thinking through how that would be built and then seeing it happen did you guys have a working down there every step back and say how can this happen how can this all get done in time well at the time it was it was not to say that it was just a job but it was it was our mission our work to do it and the bosses would tell us look we’re not going to let money get in the way of putting people on the moon so whatever you need journeyman engineer you know gs-11 I could sign purchase request for up to fifty thousand dollars for sole source procurement a lot of money in 1964 the point is that it was or whatever it takes the commitment is there to to let us have that availability of that resource and and we did it it was hard work but it was rewarding work and and you didn’t have to have a highly visible job to feel important you could work in a building that had no windows in the middle of the night which I often did and you knew that you were just as important as somebody pressing buttons in the control center or a launch day in front of the cameras didn’t matter Junior you were at Marshall for for most of this time and again back to to what was in place when the president gave his speech and Saturn 5 wasn’t barely made been somebody’s dream but but it certainly didn’t documented very well to build that whole thing and get what you do how’d you get there well certainly Bob those were ain’t very exciting times but but at that time I was believed 27 years old I was actually done a Pratt Whitney when Kennedy made his speech and I was working and immersed in the development of the of the RL 10 lakhs hydrogen cryogenic engine and a friend told me about a position and opening and Marshall and and so I took it in and the day we left Pratt Whitney kennedy was assassinated so I drove all the way to Huntsville Alabama stopping about every 45 minutes to get the status of of what his health was and eventually you know he passed on but anyway my early days at Marshall were very challenging because of my experience at honey RL 10 in cryogenics then I was assigned to lead a small team to work with the people of Rocketdyne particularly on a j2 engine the job on the j2 at that time it was just it was really normal development there was really no Pogo problems no combustion instability like on the f1 but there was a big problem and that was we couldn’t start the damn thing it was a the required conditioning it had two applications as you know it were five of these engines on the s2 stage and one on the s4b and it had the requirement to restart and so it was getting the turbo machinery the conditions the conditions just right on the turbo machinery that were the real challenge on the on the on the j2 so most of my Apollo days were spent either on a test and or coordinating a test setup or analyzing test results that led through a qualification and at that time there was a lot of interaction as there is today with the test day in the way we would run some of these conditioning tests on that on me honey yes to application it was we used the research pumps on the s4b it was more of a of a long fuel leave the chilla turbomachine and so I never will forget we did mostly testing out of santa susana outside of canoga park at night because some of the noise issues and that seed that seemed to be the agree that they had reached with the public and so me and night I was up there on a hill was counterparts at Rocketdyne and working these test requirements but when it came to the 22 focusing on the restart and how we would condition the turbo machinery for thee for the s4b

stage several of us had an ideal why don’t we try to envelope the problem and so let’s start with a very long fuel lead and it will work our way back so we know really what works well I think you probably know what happened along fuel lead we put a lot of hydrogen on that mountain and as soon as we lit the int he didn’t sky lit up and we basically burned all all the electrical wires on testing well see was a it was a challenging time but one thing that I look back on it I never heard a beep out of marshal for the were the hear my supervisors back then they must have certainly known what happened probably knew that I was instrumental in something like that but supported this a hundred percent and my lesson really wouldn’t quite learned until some 15 or 16 years later went on a show on a shuttle main engine stand that in Mississippi most of you probably recall the main engine was somewhat late in that series and we were having a lot of rain and we were trying to get a lot of tests under our belt and we couldn’t and we couldn’t hear really work on the turbo pumps and change them out because of the rain so another of my better ideas was to let’s build a tin roof over the top button and we did that and of course that allowed us to work when it was raining but then when we tested we couldn’t remove the roof and the and the hydrogen leaks from the engine accumulated one day and we just lit up all of Mississippi so it was a there’s a lot to test I’m the j2 program for example we had about a hundred and twenty engines that was about a factor of ten more than we used in the shuttle main engine program and it certainly impressed in me and ingrained in me the necessity to thoroughly test these engines particularly on demanding cycle like the j2 had at that time it went on to be up a very successful program I think we had one engine shut down the center engine on the s2s two stage I believe that was Apollo 13 13 13 13 scared everybody to death and Marshall we were course of mission went on they had another column we never could tell whether we contributed to the one they eventually had or not but we had our head down during the mission trying to understand really what happened then and to understand but does that look back on the Apollo program we we worked hard you work very long hours it was very challenging it was immensely rewarding but there was a culture that was I think somewhat different than today even I’ve seen it I don’t know this is the right word but somewhat change or deteriorate through Skylab and through even the shuttle program and that is accountability and responsibility particularly on the young people it was just an extremely rewarding experience and somehow it it’s not the same today or wasn’t the same back even during the shuttle program the I can Apollo I don’t believe I ever wrote a red you just jumped in with your counterparts at the contractor and solve the problem you didn’t have requirements who drove design change so it was a different atmosphere and I think in some way managers got to recapture that before we were ever going to venture out on an ambitious goals that are comparable to Apollo Thank You Tara let me take you back to the second test flight of the Apollo 5 and there were some j2 issues on that flight if my reading was right you lost almost one of the outboard engines on the s2 and then had to shut down the other one on automatic to get symmetric and then got your way almost orbiters jate the third stage also j2 got you there but then the restart wouldn’t go and without that being fixed no one’s going to the moon obviously and

yet the test program that that couldn’t you guys had to go to entirely different thought process go to high altitude rather than than a flight or sea level test for the the actual hardware what was going on at Marshall how did you think your way through we still got to make this work and have you know you never quit looking for solutions well I don’t think there was really ever thoughts later in a program that we couldn’t make it work very early people like lynn wilson McDonnell Douglas had a have had a big concern that we can ever develop the JJ I mean J to the restart for the s4b stage but later on I think a very fortunate situation we found ourselves in we had plenty of test hardware this was something that dr. von Braun and everhard Reese William erotique who were very strong on and we had a lot of hardware and of course you know that’s money but Apollo had a had a good bit of money and so we had to resources we had the people to do it and on occasion we did go to AED seat for the altitude testing to demonstrate that it would work I don’t remember ever having a feeling that somehow we wouldn’t be able to make the systems work to go to the minute it was always a concern you know k could you forgotten some or overlooked something would it be safe enough but but systematically have worked and it was a it was a steady drumbeat of the test test test that’s the way you demonstrated me you know I I’d extrapolate from that jr. what’s remarkable what’s remarkable to me about that is bit of failure in each of the three stages during the second Saturn 5 flight and the next 75 we took to the moon for the first time with men on board now that is a whole different culture right there in terms of the risk-averse nature of how we deal with problems and God help us know failure kind of a thought that goes through the whole structure of our programs today it’s really different and there are multiple things during particularly Apollo where we had a bad problem we bootstrapped up and we didn’t repeat it to a three times the show is fixed we went forward I think that’s a very significant aspect now I agree with your knee i think it’s it’s a challenge that nasa and industry has to has to face as we go forward in confidence in each other let me guess they are a little bit about the Von Braun team bunch of people came over after were close knit all the sudden the space program comes under NASA instead of under army redstone a lot of people like you come into the program that aren’t part of that initial group how did that grow what was the von Braun’s leadership like he was a very he was a special guy very cash matic i was i was young probably in my early 30s by the time that i really got to know him but whenever he came into a conference room he would go around and shake everybody’s hand and he would go ahead and conduct the meeting i recall on one occasion he I ever get what the issue was but he said I want to hear from my senior people and so he he went around a room and he ended up with Eberhardt and he said the final score from this was 13 23 or something I forget the number and he said and I vote with the three and so we win it was a very tough on a German extremely tough on the journey every now and then in a big conference room a German would tend to drift off those and on one occasion he came he took his shoe off he came behind him and slapped the table like that and fellow jumped up but he was you know he’d make up for in a minute he was a jovial fella he had a lot of humor very demanding but the guy that was really behind it was everhard Reese he was a nuts and bolts of

display flight center and made it work let me just comment a bit too for those that don’t know eberhardt was a deputy to von Braun but when i joined marshall as i mentioned my first boss was a german but you know they were just was no difference i mean we were just one team honestly and i never saw any kind of any kind of difficulties whatsoever I just worked together closely and of course they brought an awful lot of talent into the end of the business so it was a great experience working with those guys on our knees comment you know you have a couple of problems than the next launch you go to the moon yeah I mean that’s what word it was his leadership here’s an eberhard leadership that would bore it on whatever the problem was test it until it was nailed and then you know let’s press on and go on Jack they put all this stuff together then stuck you on top of it I’m sorry they put all this stuff together and stuck you on top oh yeah well how did you get into this first group of scientists astronauts program was going to go on forever when you probably applied and all of a sudden is getting short and he’ll tell us about how and and you were probably far more involved as i understand it with you know spilling coffee and the span which means you actually were in the spin yeah much did all the way you were lecture the regret of some of the people here I was in span at least on one evening no I did spend a lot of time in the Mission Control Center right I started of course with the USGS gene shoemaker hired me to come and work on some NASA contracts that they had and soon after I arrived in November of nineteen sixty of four I right in July and in November 1964 that the results of Harry Hess gene shoemaker and others in the National Academy bore fruit their efforts broke for fruit nasa put out a request for the fourth group of astronauts to be scientists and engineers and i read that on the bulletin board there in Flagstaff and thought for about 10 seconds and raised my hand in a sense and and volunteered I figured that if some of some people had a chance to go the moon and I hadn’t volunteered I’d probably regret it and obviously now that turned out to be true of course I had to go in those days to all of the scientists that were brought in the two groups were brought in and that during the Apollo era had to go to pilot training to become jet pilots and be able to fly the t-38 and that was a very very appropriate requirement I think although i think deke Slayton had a different motivation before requiring it he was never very happy with having scientists in the astronaut office but we all got through pilot training at least the r group did and ended up in houston in 1966 the summer of nineteen sixty-six and began not only the sort of formal training on various aspects of spaceflight that the astronaut office had put together under al shepherd but it gave all of us a chance to start to stretch our wings if you will and try to find out what the heck was going on at the Johnson Space Center and I very quickly realized through a recommendation that George Abby gave me that most of the action was over in flight control and so Jerry and Griffin and Gene Kranz and Glynn Lunney and suddenly saw me show up over there and try to get in you some of their sort of clued up simulators to learn what the spacecraft were all about they had put together a training program for their flight controllers and I jumped into that as much as I could with my other duties and soon one of the things that happened very quickly was in 1968 George Lowe persuaded NASA correctly that a great deal could be gained by flying the C prime mission to the moon that became Apollo 8 and the Frank Borman called me into his office and said Jack would you do the flight planning for our lunar orbit activity and i said i’d be happy to Frank of course and and that put me in contact with somebody whose name hasn’t been mentioned but should and that’s built in de yeah bill really was the glue that held an awful lot of this activity together in terms of flight planning and procedures that were going to be used on the missions and with the

Apollo 8 experience then Tom Stafford called me into the office and said Jack I want you to do the same thing for Apollo 10 well for Apollo 8 I divide that was only what we do eight ten orbits 10 organs and you could do that on a spiral around the moon you could draw a diagram in flight plan on a spiral and Tom said I want to have that flight plan I want to see it and well Apollo 10 had a few more orbits and that spiral started to get awfully bit big and that was about the last time anybody even considered trying to diagram a flight plan on one sheet of paper but we did and one thing that had happened though in that process reminds me of some other names is that Apollo 8 was so successful everybody had great confidence in the site that it was targeted to remember we targeted each of these missions to a place on the moon so we run all those procedures to it to a real place and that place for Apollo 8 was the easternmost site that had been selected as a possible Apollo landing site and we knew something about it well everybody felt very confident so occurred to me said well we feel that confident about that site let’s target Apollo 10 to the next site east and they’re going to be there long enough to see a third side and sew in the strategic sense if we have to have a hole for Apollo for the first lunar landing we will have experience with three sites across the face of the moon let’s see like a great idea but I couldn’t find anybody in flight control that wanted to redo the data pack and this particularly I couldn’t get first craft to think about redoing the data back until but one of the last meeting I had with the that level with Chris and and others on this subject Jerry hammock was in attendance and we had this to this view graph in those days the long list of all the advantages to retargeting Apollo 10 remember it was going to fly fairly quickly after Polly retarding Apollo 10 to the next site to the west and the last bullet was and will land in daylight in the Pacific and Jerry hammock came out of a chair I don’t whether you were very much here but he came out of his chair said all of that and a daylight landing two and chris said okay we’ll do it and so we took it up to george MO and and i didn’t think we had sold it to George Lowe but they and in those days remember I’ve used the phrase a lot we were working 16-hour days 10 28 day weeks really work everybody was at it and the meeting was at nine o’clock at night with George Lowe and Sam Phillips was in attendance am being the the program manager and one of the Giants of the Apollo era and I made the presentation Tom Stafford was there and and George looked very very skeptical about the whole thing and Tom and I left thinking that you know we didn’t we didn’t make the sale next morning George called tom says we’re going to slip the landing this required one day slip in the launch date and we’re going to slip to May 17th and andrey target and i still have a feeling to this day although i don’t know that sam phillips was a guy that that really made the final sale force on that oh yeah those are the kind of things going on then they did in the middle of all that this was nineteen sixty eight the president’s Science Advisory Council he said asked for briefing on the or slamming and they wanted astronauts to give the briefings and so that put me in the middle and I was assigned by Al Shepard to do the EBA planning for Apollo then Apollo 11 and the first lunar landing and that got me involved in EV a planning which I carry I carried through in detail through Apollo 12 before I was assigned as backup on Apollo 15 and and actually started training for flights also in the middle of all that I persuaded Jim Lovell to undertake a major revision of the astronaut science training program for lunar surface operations and that was put under way during that period of time and eventually affected all of the missions to the moon and really made it possible to say that Apollo was one of the greatest scientific experiments was ever run in spite of the fact that was not part of the original plan let me conclude just by saying there’s a number of things have come up here that sort of illustrate what it took to do it in that time frame Jim Webb asks his engineers George Lowe and Bob go booth and others to give me an estimate prior to the Kennedy announcement of what it would take to put a man on the moon and the engineers you know went through all the

numbers and came up with generally a number around eight billion dollars in those year dollars web to his credit double bit when he went and asked for the money and that’s why what that man we had a hundred percent management reserve and these guys have all referred to the fact there was money in Apollo we didn’t overspend that it did take about 16 billion dollars to land the first mission on the moon we spent more afterwards for other mission but you got to remember that management preserve is absolutely essential if you to take care of those unknown unknowns many of which have been described here today and if we and we just haven’t had it we just don’t do that anymore and somebody has to stand up and the responsible position say you got to do it you got to have that management server or you start to slip schedules and ultimately many times you lose programs also you got to have the right tech base to start with you got to have a management system in place that we gradually developed for Apollo that catalytic event was extremely important for the getting the program off the ground but again it’s been alluded to because we were all young it takes youth average age during that period of time and NASA and I’m sure it was true and all the contractors was in the on the order of 25 years gene Kranz did an estimate of what it was in the flight control business for Apollo 13 a period and it was 26 years today the average age of NASA and I’m sure many of the contractors is 50 factor two different we got to change that and then most of all as Neil Armstrong has pointed out in several of his talks recently there’s this question of trust and we all had it all trusted what was going on and trusted all of these guys to do it right and they did and I want to thank you very much Jack whether you let me take you back to the 30 VA and as I read the mission report in QA afterwards when you got back and all incredible science stuff found on that EPA and the other two before but but certainly that one but it also brought home the relationship between you guys on the moon through capcom 2 to Jerry who was the flight director was telling you too I think the wording was you need to be moving in case you didn’t get that message earlier what was the relationship between astronauts and the flight control more especially during a mission well the primary relationship was trust I had total I spent so much time with these guys that I felt they were and I’m sure all the other astronauts did even if they may not have spent quite as much time as I did they felt they were part of the team and if if you got a message direct or indirect from through the Capcom you know a lot of people were behind that message and if they thought that you were running behind schedule and needed to get moving well we needed to get movie there’s no question by they said the there was a cryptic message that came up every once a while and they thought your heart rate was getting too long too high nobody else knew what it meant but we did and and you knew that that’s what they were saying because we we had not the instrumentation Bob talked about but we had enough information you get respiratory rate in heart rate and and that that would that was important information to have because when you’re in that environment and you know that there’s a finite amount of time left to complete the tasks that you’ve set out for yourself and others have expect you to complete then you will tend to let other people watch over those kinds of questions and and you get deeply involved in what you’re doing and I certainly did that and and I worked a little bit too hard sometimes I know gene did particularly drilling holes and things like that and we just had to trust that somebody else was going to let us know that we needed to back off a little bit 22 hours on the moon isn’t very long we were in a magnificent mountain valley three dimensional geology everywhere the mountains on either side were seven thousand feet high so spectacular place to be and also we were already making right from the very beginning making discoveries that were challenging some of the basic and still today challenged some of the basic ideas that scientists have had about the origin and evolution of the moon so I found it one of the most extraordinary fact the most extraordinary site in geological time of course of my life other things have happened since that have been in interesting but but that sort of takes a cake there’s a apparently in the accent oh do it’s a lot more significant than the reading but it’s some guy named

Schmidt saying it’s orange oh yeah well I that was stationed for shorty crater and everybody thinks shorting was named after shorty powers and I apologize to Shorty’s ghost but it wasn’t it was named after trout fishing in America shorty who was a character in one of Kurt Vonnegut’s books that I was reading at the time and and when I was we had that particular station had been selected because of a very very dark crater looked very much like an impact crater and indeed it turned out to be but it might have been a volcanic crater and so we had been thinking about even before the mission that they might see something unusual at that crater and as I walked up to the rim I scuffed up some dirt and looked down and it was orange and a very slight tent in the right and the regular the debris layer covering it that was different than what we have been seen and then I started to immediately dig a half trench with my my scoop and revealed very bright red orange and yellow material in in the rim of this crater and that orange soil as it was called then alcohol the orange pyroclastic glass has made it very very difficult for these people that think the moon formed by a giant impact of a mars-sized asteroid on the earth because that orange soil contains volatile material that probably could not survive such an event and and we had also brought our attention to the samples that Dave Scott picked up and Jim Irwin picked up on Apollo 15 as become known as a green glass park plastic glass and that has a similar volatile composition that makes it very very difficult to imagine that an event like I just described for the origin of the moon would be possible so we still have a lot of thinking to do about the origin moon and partly in large part because we found the orange glass yeah I’d like to say something about Jack this this is the guy that not on the way home decided he could resign as our flight director well not saying everybody years old and this is kind of an important perspective of Apollo the first several missions that we flew to the moon was more transportation oriented that is to say we were learning how to get out there how to operate for a while and then get back the last three missions were we called him the J missions it was a different block of spacecraft much more capability had the rover had a thing we call the sim Bay which did a lot of mapping of the moon from the command module and service module did state in orbit and I i really think the way I’ve always thought that the last three missions we really focused on science we had better tools we had longer stays and we had a scientist now one of the things that he told you about he jumped in bed with the flight controllers he he tempted us is what he did he was single at that then I lived very close to the center and he always had a refrigerator full of cold beer so quite often after we would work for 10 or 15 hours at the center then we would retire to Jack’s apartment and that’s where he really got in and got his licks in but it it did something it bonded us to Jack in a different kind of way in by the time when I was the lead flight director on Apollo 15 and 17 I was actually going into the field on field geology training with the astronauts here on earth and what they would do is select sites very very nearly as close as they could get to what the terrain looked like where they were going to land and Jack was instrumental in getting me and then later other flight directors in and it made a world of difference I’ve really got a feel for what they were going through so Jack thank you I never have said that well done well thank you sir I appreciate it it’s a lot of fun and it was a good cold beer a lot of it Oh lots of cool yeah lots of great ideas including one to land on the far side of the moon but we never sold out they’re not even Sam Phillips would buy that one NASA did a book and I think 1975 missions to the moon its series of essays by people though the last one it is by jack schmitt it’s called great journeys of exploration back in the 1700 1679 errs there was a great voice voyages of discovery and the title is taken from that same thought process it is an absolutely wonderful piece to read if you ever get a chance to do that Glen here the you were the youngest guy in in that when you started at 21 years old at

Langley get moved to two well from Lewis then to Langley then to JSC and through the entire program what at what a time well yeah I guess it’s the genius of being in the right place at the right time and being willing to jump into it i graduated 2021 june and 58 by that time i had been i had several tours at the lowest research center where i worked as a co-op student my wind tunnels heat transfer work thrust reversers engine test cells and so on so i had a lot of that kind of experience and more more than the average fellow would have getting out of college and the first month I was there June of 58 this drawing came across my desk and it was a drawing of what became the mercury spacecraft done by a guy named cadwal johnson when i worked with great length later in life and come by here and i was wondering what it was and my boss was telling me that well the guys down at Langley our thing can of building something like this and find it so my reaction was in about after about 30 seconds of thought that this looks like it would be a lot of fun I’d like to work on it and that was the start we took work back to Lewis from the from the space task group guys did it back in Cleveland then I started traveling down there got to be up all week coming home on coming to Cleveland back in Cleveland on the weekends and eventually I moved down there in 59 so in about a year or so I was down at Langley full time and it was just it just always just continued to take off it always had new dimensions and challenged us matter of fact I was describing to somebody the other day that the problem we had with succession is that we were all being pulled to do something larger than we ever thought we were ready to do as opposed to being stacked up and waiting and it was a fun time it was really dramatic I wouldn’t mention a couple things about some observations on Apollo at the peak of a man power on Apollo there were about 400,000 people in the country working on it and they were working on all kinds of things you see here represented to set of people and some of us from different disciplines some from the same but all those other people were working on all kinds of things to make the Apollo program work they were building the hardware that flew both the launch vehicles and the spacecraft and the Rovers and the suits and everything else that we needed to fly they were put in facilities in place all around the country especially especially down with the Bob seek in Florida I mean the facilities that got put in at the caper just still today are magnificently large and powerful facilities as any of you would have seen him with no and I was lucky I was part of what for this audience I guess I would call it the mission team we called it in those days flight operations that’s as good a term to as any and I just happened to fall into that because when I first started working I was working on the trajectory aspects of the Mercury program which included how would we would monitor the SN phase and how would we figure out the D orbits and so on and so on so we were working on the relatively few trajectory options that we had during a flight that we might exercise in judgment over and so that’s how I got in my first position in the control center as someone who monitored the flight of the vehicle somewhat similar to arrange safety officer although rain safety protects geography and people we were trying to protect the mission the crew from getting to conditions from which the aborts would be not survivable so I spent a lot of time doing that and and as we moved along with the rest of this team of four hundred thousand working on the vehicles we had a team of about maybe five hundred to a thousand people in Houston who were dedicated to the planning the analysis the we also had the flight control team and I’m by that i’m referring not to stabilization in control but rather the team that was in the control center team of people in the control center and of course the flight crews and this team of people was was beginning to come together and there were various catalyst probably the best catalyst for bringing that team of people together was a built-in d’l’ed fellow that Jack Schmitt mentioned but

there were lots of Heroes many of them knowns many of them unknown who contributed mightily to that process so here the rest of this country was building this magnificent hardware and we were going to get to be the guys who could deploy it and use it on our path to the moon so our job was in simple terms to accomplish the mission as it was defined each time as a matter of fact it’s been reported here i would also say for the benefit of the young people that indeed at that time because of the nature of the business we had very many new young people right out of college who within a couple of years would be in the control center making critical decisions probably the most famous of which is the Apollo landing were two guys who were involved in the guidance computer one in the back room and one in the front Jack garment and back Steve bales the front called that as a go condition to land and I think at the time there were 24 and 26 or thereabouts– and and were representative of the people that we had in the control center at the time I was kind of an old guy at that time I was about 32 or so when we landed on the moon the control center was a interesting place to be because if you think about it this way it helps to get a picture it was kind of a hub that was there to support and advise the astronauts from both a mission and a safety point of view but it had spokes going out to all kinds of places for additional support what I would call in depth support Arnie has talked about the the function whereby we tapped into accessed the government engineering and the contractor engineering teams for assistance during the flight and by the way Arnie turned that into a very solid authoritative system so that when we got answers back we knew that they had been reviewed by the right people we knew that it was an authoritative answer it wasn’t it wasn’t just who was on the shift at the time it was it was an answer that you could bet your life on which in some cases we did and it was a hub for other things that’s a hub out to the recovery forces it was a hub to interface with Bob’s team at the cape and a variety of other places but but it was always it was always conducted in a way that the relationships were based on the variable that Jack calls trust they were always that way and it made for a very strong control center very capable of being able to do the job that was entrusted to us I would say when we were doing mercury a wait a way to think about Apollo and what was going on is that when we did the mercury flight who have flights we finished the program if you were to ask how much of what we have to do in terms of flight operations and the mission and Mission Control and the integration with the crews and the planners how much of what we had to do for Apollo did we have under our belt did we have mastery of at the completion of mercury and this is a subjective number on my part but I would say it was about five to ten percent guys might have a different opinion but it was relatively low we had then to grapple with all of the problems that we were going to face when we had to go to the moon because our ships were spacecraft were moving away from the analog design that we’d used for telemetry in command we’re going to digital machines both in Gemini and Apollo we were going to do a lot of maneuvering we were going to do rendezvous docking docked maneuvers we had to navigate out to the moon eventually we had to figure out how to land a lunar module on the surface how to use the system we had how best incorporate the cues that the astronauts could derive from their observations of what was going on I had to put all that stuff together so it was a it was quite a time in terms of doing that one of the biggest cyst to that and it’s an interesting lesson that I don’t hear very many people talking about the Gemini program which was a two-man ship to explore all of this including EV a long duration etc was put in place and we had 10 man flights in the middle 60s at during which time we tried everything that we could and that vehicle to prepare ourselves for going to the moon and i would say that by the end of gemini we were probably masters of seventy percent of what we needed to know to be able to get there but the

point I wanted to make was there were a lot of people at the time who in typical fashion the way we look at things were coveting the budget or the money that was being spent on Gemini and the Apollo people would have preferred that we canceled it and put all the money into the Apollo development and it can understand it from their point of view because they were looking at it as a money for development subject the Gemini program was also rounding out the Apollo team so that the team that had to take care of the Mission Operations part of the flight did indeed have the experience in the testing that they needed the Gemini program turned out to be the boot camp for the apollo team if you look at the people who flew the people who were in the control center high degree of a commonality and even if they didn’t even if in some cases the astronauts didn’t lie like Jack didn’t fly he was involved in what we were doing and grew to absorb it and to love it as much as he did geology I was I was proud of him but as a grand time for us and looking back on it you know most of us have feelings now that we probably didn’t have time to express in those days and I think as you can probably tell from this discussion and you can tell from any of the people who are involved in the program in any way all of which were important in all of which contributed to the success people who did this love this work they loved it and they loved the fact that it was successful and that they had each of us had some part to play in making Apollo a success so it’s a grand way to be retired and look back on some of the things that we did because Apollo clearly is a glowing bright spot for all of us Thank You Jerry yeah I wanted to make one point today we’ve talked a lot about NASA and the contractors and that’s appropriate it was a superior team in trust and all that quite often in Apollo the the story of Mercury Gemini Apollo I think we have overlooked the contribution and the vital importance of the US military and how many of you in this room are associated with military space and that was mainly Air Force of course but in the early days had we not had some of the military tracking facilities we had people human resources that we actually used people that came to NASA from the military that helped us in key positions management positions we had recovery forces that the Navy provided and other support that and we had communication aircraft what we call those Neriah yeah oh right yeah yeah and and we had the Corps of Engineers with the big facilities that were built and I just I think the military sector of getting us there has never been recognized for the for the great job and we would not have been able to pull it off without him and I think we need to take note of that yeah they were best test pilots from them to Jerry remember so again and Sam Phillips brought the ICBM management experience which was a model that NASA did not have a very good grasp of at the time in terms of the staged development of the design process and so on and second hillis brought that to the agency and continues today it was it was a terrific addition to the management scheme NASA was not was not employ until the fullest until they came through that bit of training and that bit of carryover from the ICBM program to NASA but an exam was the title for the Gemini program was diamond of Defense developed ICBMs them Jem and I wouldn’t have flown without the Titan to mercury Atlas atlas redstone Arnie you had I just want to say one more thing to follow what Glenn said and that is I talked a lot about CSM and the most traumatic mission for the CSM and Apollo was Apollo 13 yeah but not just CSM the whole control center was traumatized when we had the action of 50 hours into the flight we had never seen we had never simulated

the situation we had to have a recovery plan but we had a lot of people who dealt with many anomalies and could think quickly and do these replanting things to find a way to see if we could recover and one of the most critical things was we realized we could have to use the limb but it was totally powered down the CSM we knew we’d need to land in the ocean when we came back but it was totally powered up and it was going to run out of the electrical power you need at the end if we didn’t do something with it quickly and as I recall Glenn was the flight director either when it happened off of the shift that followed directly after it happened and I think the most important thing that happened during Apollo 13 was the the plan that Glenn put together that sequence those things we had to do thought them through and put them in place within the time frame that allowed it all to happen because we could have lost it just fumbling around if we taking the day to figure out what to do it would have been all over and I thought that was one of the dramatic things that happened during the Apollo program I think the movie is a great movie but it doesn’t do justice to the incredible span of people that were involved and gene Kranz quotas failure is not an option when money is quoted was saying we can never run out of options you can never quit the process of finding options and I as I recall from reading Glen the process of moving from the mod from the capsule into the LEM and in that whole process you sort of orchestrated that whole thing and without that nothing else matters kind of real tribute to the entire team and again I’m speculating you guys correct me but but certainly mr. Krantz was the flight director at the time but his crew were then was basically taken offline to work the problem and the other flight directors continued to manage that whole mission in lockstep just make it all work hey any comments anyone wants to make on that or I did Jack I wanted to follow up a little bit on what there’s been a little bit explicit but also implicit in a lot of what has been said and that is that the idea of connections for example NASA came out of the long long experience with aircraft development and test the National Advisory Committee on the aeronautics NH naca that the senior managers many of the senior managers had that experience base and then Glenn just mentioned Sam Phillips bringing another experience base a connection back into other programs that had been successful and and there’s there’s one of on the political side that I’ve always found very interesting and that is that the role at Eisenhower played which most people don’t recognize in january nineteen sixty if you re Glenn a t Keith Glennon’s diary Eisenhower personally sent a letter to Glenn insane start the super booster program and we know where that led and he also lies in her over the long drawn-out objections of the United States Army with all the contributions that they made later the corps of engineers and others still objected to having the huntsville group transferred into nasa the missile defense agency i think it was called something like that but i made sure that that happened and he laid the groundwork and people have to remember this in spite of the fact you won’t find any support from human spaceflight and eisenhower speeches that i found yet he by those actions laid the groundwork for Kennedy’s challenge to become credible and again and if you even want to take that connection back farther it was on Ike’s watch that von Braun was pulled out of Germany instead of ending up in the Soviet Union and his group so those connections take us back a long long way and with the NACA take us back I think to 1914 and it’s something to remember that you have to maintain those connections and the AI double-a is one of the organizations that I think does that and I congratulate you for continuing that process let me ask one more question we have a few minutes and I apologize that we didn’t have time to do Q&A front from the audience but it it’s only that’s I’ve speculated about four years and that was it seems like we were either we thought we were when constrained at Apollo 11 and only bring back so many rocks and yet by the time of Apollo 14 we had a transporter by 15 and 16 17 we had Rovers bringing back

250 pounds of rocks instead of 30 or 40 or whatever the first number i guess i’ll start with junior or whomever how much margin was in that program from day one that we just grew into and how much did you actually have to do during the program to get more capability out of out of all the systems the lamb is the command service module the capsule itself and of course the saturn stack was there a margin or was it were we actually developing as we went along i think there was some developing as who know I believe it there was a lot of margin in that whole Saturn design of the lunar rover and it was it was manifest through the testing it was done it was very expensive very thorough I think Frank mentioned one of the stages blue early in the in the development cyclist will be but I can’t recall other than a number of of f-1 engines that blew up because of combustion instability and by the way that problem on the day we launched Apollo 11 that problem was still hanging there there was there was a lot of confidence in it but but it wasn’t you know we did you know we didn’t really understand the root cause but through all the testing of the all the elements of Apollo I think that’s where the confidence was drawn and in the leadership ie von Braun and others took that and built on it and executed the program Jack and I think senior management Mike most of my contacts were through the gorge low and the CCB configuration control board activities and things like that and my impression was that that confidence that JR just mentioned translated up through the management team both in the lowes decision in a very trying year for test failures and launched difficulties to push through the Apollo 8 concept but also it that around that same time low was beginning to move on the development of the block to lunar module which was significantly heavier and gave us three days capable as a matter of fact the block to lunar module who could have met the objectives of the O’Shea’s design reference mission which was for EPA’s it’s just that you had to trade payload against da time and so that gave us the three eb a capability but it meant a confidence that the saturn was already there in 68 69 to do these kinds of things later early in the 1970s so again that they apparently at the senior management level there was enough dialogue and understanding going on to make these kind of decisions so the margins I think in the Saturn system were were there and I I suspect we left a little on the table even with Apollo 7 I think so speaking of the speaking of upper management in NASA I’d like to tell you a brief story that hasn’t been told very many places Apollo 13 explosion happened and and my team was on for the rest of the evening after Jane’s team came off they’d been on all day so they cut off about an hour and then my was on for a long time at which time we developed the plan that Arnie was talking about for getting back to the earth and stabilizing the situation that we were faced with in terms of this abandoned ship routine that we had to go through but the puente story is by the next morning all of the eagles and stars and brass and NASA showed up in our control center all of them there was a roomful them and I had gone to a press conference to talk to people and Jerry was coming on duty right after after my shift so Jerry and I went down to the one of the viewing rooms where we collected up all the brass and I was 32 and Jerry Jerry is about the same was standing up there and we’re telling him what happened as best we knew and what the consequences were and what we did and what the options were for coming home and which one we wanted to pick and then I stopped and I had one technical question from deke slayton and then Tom Paine who was the administrator of NASA said he didn’t ask me a lot of questions he didn’t nitpick or

I crew manages and here we were 32 years old looking at him and he he looks at Jerry mean he says is there anything we can do to help you guys that was all he asked is there anything that we can do to help you guys and you know at the time we took it literally and said well you know we don’t think so we got everything going at cetera but later on as I matured some more I reflected on that and said to myself wow wow that speaks volumes about the kind of leadership we had in the NASA management team they were just absolutely terrific they they trusted us and they let us do our job and you know over the years then we saw at least I saw a creep where we were taking decisions higher and higher as we went along and there were these two kids talking to the is going cause of the Eagles and that’s all Tom Paine said is there anything we can do to help and that was about the end of the meeting and they trusted us to go do it and we were a bunch of young people after that you could start to see that as the agency matured in aged the decision started getting pulled up higher and higher and we saw it I saw it in shuttle when I was the director at JSC well no as I just left and I remember one occasion I don’t remember the situation but I remember where the where the administrator actually made the decision on a go no-go and I think it was a launch in the administration of a decision that would have never happened that model that would never happen area frank kearney Bob junior jack when thank you so much great time very good yeah thank you also to Lockheed Martin for their sponsorship and orbital sciences for sponsoring the recording of this session which will be available on youtube or something when we finally figure out our web strategy but Sharon Grayson’s walking across the front is going to do that we are very fortunate to have a welcome to Colorado by the lieutenant governor lieutenant governor brian is with us she has in the ambitious agenda she and the governor obviously for education health and wellness and aerospace issues colorado is the number to state in the country in terms of aerospace not obviously not solely Lockheed Martin with but a great collection of military civil in commercial space she serves as the co-chair of the Colorado space coalition and is actively involved in the coalition of aerospace states actively a promoter of technology engineering math education and a large number of children’s programs governor thank you so much for joining us please thank you Bob and welcome to Denver the Mile High City and as I try and remind people when there’s a chance they’re new to Colorado as you all know the altitude can have an impact on your body so lots of water and taking it easy in the altitude till you get used to it is usually what we recommend to the Flatlanders as you heard we are home to a very vibrant robust aerospace industry second largest in the nation in terms of number of employees and I think that’s the outcome of having a very strong link between our research universities and the aerospace industry as many of you probably know we’ve graduated more astronauts from the university of colorado at boulder than any other university in the country and it is one of the five top priority industries for the governor for support and economic development in colorado so we are very honored to have you here today and very committed to making sure that at least our part of aerospace is healthy and moving forward even as we all go through little ups and downs it’s been a very interesting experience to be one of the co-chairs of the colorado space coalition because most of my work has to do with strengthening education and in particular trying to make sure that math and science become stronger in our public schools and that more kids are taking serious classes in math and science so that they can go on to major in engineering or biotech or whatever it

is as they move through their education and when you have a job like suddenly becoming lieutenant governor and you find your co tearing a space coalition and everyone there has spent their entire career in it and you just walk through the door you get very humble very quickly but I think what we all found was a common place to meet around what is the future of this passion that we share this industry if we have fewer and fewer kids coming through the pipeline and how can we make aerospace in space exciting how can we get kids understanding how you study and apply math and science and how many career opportunities are going to grow out of that willingness to study hard and look for ways to apply and I really appreciate it that you know if you if you stay in there and stay the course you can teach you can do research you can work for a great country company like Lockheed Martin you can be an entrepreneur I met a couple of guys who are living on I think chicken broth and a little propane heater in a cabin in the mountains but they’re building something they’re just positive it’s going to transform space exploration who knows if they will but boy are they excited about it so just the range of opportunities I think are unique in a lot of ways to this industry it also provides as you know really good jobs with good salaries good benefits of the opportunity for internal promotion we have about a hundred and seventy six thousand jobs in Colorado related to the aerospace industry which puts us in that number two spot we also have a critical mass of resources that are available to aerospace here we have four military commands we have the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration and the National Center for Atmospheric Research what we do in our space coalition is try and make sure that the military the researchers and the private sector are meeting to come up with a common agenda for Colorado where these sectors mingle and then put forth an action agenda for both the state our congressional delegation and the leaders of our companies so we are I think we’re in a good place to show that the more these sectors can interest intersect the more opportunity the greater chance for being on the cutting edge is going to come to our companies we are actively recruiting companies that would like to relocate to Colorado we have more sunny days than San Diego so if anyone here is thinking they might like to Rico Kate here to Colorado I’d be very happy to talk to you about that that’s my chamber of commerce spiel but I want to talk now a little bit about the issue of this education stream coming into aerospace in space as many of you probably know there are international tests of the 15 year olds of the 30 most developed countries in the world and it used to be that Colorado and the nation were in the top one two three year after year on those tests especially in math math and science we’ve now out of those 30 companies dropped down to 21st for science and 25th for math so we have not only not held our position but other countries have caught up to us and surpassed us and I think that you would agree that that is not the way to sustain the strength and creativity of our aerospace industry in fact that’s one reason we have been we as a country have been importing so many engineers from other countries but I think we all know that the visa issues around importing foreign talent are making that harder and harder we have to grow our own we also want to make sure that as we talk about the education of our kids and the next generation of leaders and entrepreneurs that we don’t start to approach math and sciences just things you drill drill drill that we’ve got to keep a balance in the schools and for those of you who are parents I know you know that there are a lot of kids who are in school just because of the arts classes they can take but there are lots of ways that arts and STEM education you know science technology engineering and math can merge together in the lives of the next

generation and even though it’s not aerospace I have talked to people in the video gaming industry and they want kids who know math and science but also know art because that intersection is where the gaming industry lives so lots of opportunities if we just make sure kids have the strong skills that they need we have also been struggling in this country I think with some cultural issues around education and I will say this as the mother of two boys I didn’t make my kids study as hard as they should and yet we found time for their soccer team to make sure you know they always have the practice time they need I think we all know that there are so many demands on the time of young people that as a culture we have to get back to valuing excellence in education excellence in the classroom and the willingness to do the hard work that it takes to master a subject and get good grades in it and feel you can go on and major in it Colorado is trying to tackle this by being one of the first states in the nation to completely revise our grade level standards from pre-school all the way through twelfth grade and instead of taking Nevada or Texas as our comparison for our standards we decided to pick the two top performing countries in the developed world finland in singapore and matched our standards against theirs so we are determined to make sure that our pipeline of kids are in every grade level moving toward what they need to be internationally competitive and then doors will open for their futures we also know that we have to find a way to make the teaching profession more attractive so that engineers who are maybe in mid to late career might decide they want to go back into teaching and teach in a high school or middle school and try and get our math and science skills up right now in our national high schools one-third of the math teachers and two-thirds of the physical science teachers never majored in that subject most the time that means they picked up a couple classes at a community college or a summer school because the school needed to fill a slot and they went in to fill that slot we need the best and the brightest coming in to teach so that you can hire the best and the brightest when they come out of the education system and they’ve really seen what it is to be passionate about these subjects and to be able to do them with with creativity and confidence we also know that if kids start out behind they almost never catch up and that if we have kids who are behind in the vocabulary let’s say they come from chaotic homes you know by kindergarten or first grade they can be so far behind in their basic skills that they absolutely never catch up so I know most of you are going to be interested in maybe middle school definitely high school definitely college but when you go home to your communities when you talk to friends who might be on a school board or might be a teacher if we can make sure more kids are caught up in preschool and kindergarten the other teachers will have a much easier time pushing them forward and meeting those high standards of in our case Finland and Singapore as they go forward instead of constantly falling behind and staying there we are part of an of a national competition that President Obama and Secretary of Education Arne Duncan have created and I imagine most of you come from states that are just starting to pay a 10 into this but they are so concerned about the quality of education and it’s linked to the industries that are going to make us competitive in the future like aerospace like having the ability to do space exploration that they have created a competitive bid process in your language called race to the top every state is going to be invited to compete it will be a pot of money of a little over four billion dollars they expect to select eight states and they are going to be looking at the states that raise their standards that find a way to get the best math and science teachers into their schools early in the education continuum that are willing to create a data system for continuous improvement can you imagine this there’s right now very little way to have a continuous improvement system in

education so I want to toot the horn a little bit for United Launch Alliance because Michael gas is a co-chair with me of our education reform effort and they united launch alliance with their chief engineer Matt Smith I hope he’s here today decided to let a group of us experience their continuous improvement process but applied to an education reform issue and it was absolutely I opening about the potential of this and never before have we had the data systems that would let us measure things in increments and look at ways to tweak the system I know that something you live with every day but if there’s ways you can go back to your communities and see if you can help your educators just get this mindset into the way they work we can become a 21st century education system with the knowledge and the strategies to make sure we move up in the world and then stay there the president has talked about this attempt to reinvent education as our moon shot and I think especially hearing the panel that came to us that the race to the top and education reform education reinvention can be our moon shot and I think we also know that once American set their mind to something you can’t stop them from getting there and I hope that we will grapple with not only what we need to stay dominant in aerospace but that you’ll find ways individually to take what you know what you’ve experienced and help your local schools incorporate that so that we deliver on our own moon shot of moving back into the top tier of developed countries for the education system and in particular math and science for our kids and that’s probably the long term plan to make sure that as some of the gray hair in the room starts to retire and I am with you it’s just that I get to highlight mine and most of you probably don’t you know a lot of us are going to be retiring the average age of aerospace engineers is 55 we’ve got to get young people tackling those tough majors in college and then moving in to fill the great jobs that you all create so I look forward to seeing your industry be robust and vigorous in the future and that you will be part of making sure that the education kids get is at the level you need to do the work that’s so important for our country thank you very much what a great message and certainly resonates with an awful lot of our programs as well as we break let me thank Lockheed Martin United Launch Alliance and then obviously the governor just mentioned them Patel and jaksa are all our sponsors space news in the California Space authority who are also supporters of this program encourage you to stop by the exhibit hall it will open I guess right now but if you have a break between your papers or your technical sessions please stop in there see what some of the companies are doing some really interesting stuff and our passport to the Future program is now engaged with teachers almost as we speak in room 605 try not to disturb them too much but if you want to see what we’re doing in terms of training teachers stick your head in there as well we are now at five minutes before the start of the tech papers so consider a countdown is on thanks for coming to jpc and I ecec enjoy your stay